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What is (a) science? 
(Sarah Tietz) 
 
In “The Ends of Sciences”, Kitcher sets out to show that the whole scientific context – 
including the so-called “context of resolution” – is socially embedded and therefore value-
laden. I propose to use his line of argument in order to address a different question, 
namely: What is (a) science?  
Considering the diversity of sciences, there do not seem to be many candidates that 
could figure as an explanatory factor for all of them. However, one candidate does appear 
rather promising. I am thinking of the end or goal of sciences. Thus, it does not seem far-
fetched to assume that, among all the different goals of all sciences, there is at least one 
that is shared by all of them. To be sure, there are not very many candidates, for the 
diversity of sciences is reflected in their different goals. Yet, truth seems to represent one 
candidate that could be the goal common to all sciences. Sciences seek truth. However, its 
obvious character notwithstanding, truth cannot figure as the common goal for all sciences, 
for, as Kitcher rightly points out, the slogan “‘Seek truth!’ is plainly incomplete.”1 First of 
all, a question has to be framed. Only then is “the goal of finding a true answer … a 
sensible one.”2 That is, there are always significant types of truth that sciences look for. 
Thus, the question is whether there are types of truth that all sciences look for. In fact, such 
types of truth do indeed seem to be available. For, sciences seek the possibility of 
prediction and intervention in broad areas. Accordingly, they need statements that explain 
different special cases as instances of a common type. Therefore, it seems, sciences need 
natural laws. We could say, then, that the goal of sciences is not the search for truth, for 
this is too general, but the search for distinctive truths, namely natural laws.  
However, it cannot easily be taken for granted that natural laws are indeed the goal 
of all sciences. For, as is well known, there are many sciences such as history, political 
sciences, philosophy, and even natural sciences such as biology the findings of which do 
not take the form of natural laws. This fact, however, need not be an argument against the 
thesis that sciences aim at finding natural laws. For, one could say that those disciplines 
that do not or cannot share this end simply do not count as sciences; and for disciplines 
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such as philosophy, sociology or literature, there are numerous scholars who do indeed 
share this opinion.  
However, this opinion might be nothing but mere stipulation. What we need is a separate 
argument, one that shows why it is only the quest for natural laws that qualifies a discipline 
as a science. Yet there is also a different strategy: in order to examine the thesis that only 
those disciplines that aim at finding natural laws can be counted as sciences, we could take 
a look at and evaluate the (tacit) assumptions behind it. Kitcher points out the following: 
on the one hand, “it supposes that there’s some general project of understanding nature,” 
and on the other hand, “it assumes that there’s some manageable collection of laws that 
can be appreciated by human beings (or by recognizable idealization of ourselves) and that 
will make possible the general project.”3 These two assumptions go together with a third, 
which is almost trivial: at least one science is needed that has the collection of natural laws 
as its main goal. If other disciplines, those the generalizations of which do not take the 
form of natural laws, are to count as sciences, too, then they would better be reducible in 
one way or another to this special science. One science that aims at discovering natural 
laws is, of course, physics. Accordingly, physicalism would be the position to be held.  
All three assumptions, however, present well-known difficulties. Thus, first of all, 
after the appearance of “There is no Question of Physicalism“ by Crane and Mellor, at the 
latest, physicalism seems to be no longer tenable.4 For, physicalism faces the following 
dilemma: Who decides what is to count as a physical object? An obvious answer is, of 
course, physicists; but which physicists do we mean: are these the exponents of the current, 
or of an idealized, complete, future physics? If the first are meant, then physicalism is 
presumably false. For, it is not very likely that present-day physics has identified all 
physical entities. If, however, an idealized, complete future physics is meant, then 
physicalism amounts to something trivial. After all, an idealized and complete physics 
would necessarily pick out all basic entities, of whatever kind they might be. Yet, how are 
we to exclude the possibility that, among these basic entities, there are also numbers or 
qualia, entities that, as far as we know, are not objects of natural laws?  
Moreover, there are other problems. Indeed, if it were possible for the sciences both 
“to fall into a finite number of clusters, each of which can be subsumed under a finite 
number of basics laws” and to “extend beyond the areas of inquiry that have so far 
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that there is some collection of laws that can be appreciated by human beings (or by a 
recognizable idealization of ourselves) and that will make possible the general project of 
understanding nature could be sustained.5 Yet, as Kitcher rightly remarks, “once the unity-
of-science picture has been discarded, there’s no basis for thinking that the clusters of laws 
(even assuming we can always find them) won’t proliferate indefinitely.”6  
The third and last problem presented by these assumptions lies in the idea of some 
general project of understanding nature. For, the slogan “Understand nature!” is as 
incomplete and as meaningless as the slogan “Seek truth!”7 Also: what is meant by 
“nature”? It is obvious that attempts to answer this question present the same dilemma as 
physicalism.  
Therefore, it seems we have good reasons to abandon the thesis that only those 
disciplines whose goal is the discovery of natural laws can count as sciences. Do we have 
another goal, then, that could characterize all the sciences? Kitcher makes one more 
suggestion. Sciences, so he claims, have a common ideal: they all aim at unity. Against all 
appearances, however, this is not a proposal for a lapse back into the unity-of-science 
movement: for Kitcher as well, there is and can be no unity of science. Nevertheless, he 
claims, sciences reflect a regulative ideal, namely “the ideal of finding as much unity as we 
can by discovering perspectives from which we can fit a large number of apparently 
disparate empirical results into a small number of schemata.”8 Thus, sciences exemplify 
what Kitcher calls a “modest unificationism”. This unificationism is modest in at least two 
ways: on the one hand, as just, seen, it keeps in mind, that sciences cannot be unified for 
the reasons mentioned in the beginning. Therefore, on the other hand, this unificationism 
allows for different unifying schemes for explaining and predicting various aspects of 
nature, schemes, that “aren’t integrable into any overarching grand theory.” (347). What 
holds all sciences together, therefore, is not that they are reducible to one special science 
but that they are all modest unificationist. All sciences aim at unification. Unification is 
their a regulative ideal.  
In what follows I want to question this idea. Using the example of the relatively 
new discipline of evolutionary-developmental biology I want to suggest that unification 
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combination of disciplines or theories, or so I want to argue, is a method whose application 
depends on the problem pursued.  
First of all, a few words on evolutionary-developmental biology, short: evo-devo. 
As the words already suggest, evo-devo is a recent attempt to integrate the long separated 
disciplines of evolutionary biology and developmental biology again. The reason is that 
apart from explaining adaptation and speciation there are other questions about evolution, 
such as the question for phenotypic evolvability or the question for the evolutionary origin 
of body plans and novel structure, that require the involvement of developmental biology. 
Since genes that are involved in important early developmental events are shared across 
large groups of animals (mammals and insects, for instance) it seems obvious that 
phenotypic evolution cannot be explained by merely referring to specific changes in genes. 
What seems to be of higher impact, therefore, are evolutionary changes in how the 
activation of genes is regulated. In spite appearances to the contrary, evo-devo should not 
be seen as a simple synthesis of evolutionary and developmental biology with 
developmental genetics providing the link. For, many evo-devo problems such as 
accounting for the origin of novel structures require integrating knowledge from many 
different disciplines, such as phylogeny, population genetics, palaeontology, morphology, 
theoretical biology, ecology, and developmental genetics.  
Now, how and, above all, why are all these disciplines integrated? Let us take a 
look at the explanation of evolutionary novelties. An evolutionary novelty is understood as 
a qualitatively new morphological structure or function feature in a group of organism that 
did not exist in an ancestral species. Examples here are the vertebrate jaw, feathers and 
flight in birds, the turtle carapace, and paired fins in fish and their transformation into 
limbs in amphibians. What seems clear is that for an explanation of these novelties 
phylogeny is of high relevance. For, what is needed is a determination of the particular 
phylogenetic junctures at which characters were transformed and novelties arose in 
evolution. Thus, any explanation of the origin of novelties needs phylogentic trees. Now, 
these trees usually were based on an analysis of classical characters, such as morphological 
structures. But nowadays they are also inferred from molecular data, such as gene 
sequences. Thus, the problem is to integrate both approaches. This all the more since there 
are several cases where each supports a different phylogeny. Despite attempts of 
combining both kinds of data (by so-called total evidence approaches), there are currently 
no generally agreed upon methods of determining how to weigh the contribution of 
classical and molecular information. However, both approaches are important in order to 
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explain novelties. This holds as well for palaeontology which adds a historical-temporal 
scale to phylogenies. Palaeontology lays out the ancestral states of characters and structural 
intermediates (if any) up to the state in the descendant. On that basis it can suggest the 
particular morphological changes that constitute the origination of the novel feature. In this 
context ecology and biogeography get importance. For they help explaining how 
transitional character states in the emergence of a novelty could have been compatible with 
or positively favored by natural selection. And they help explaining how the evolution of 
this character relates to changes in geographical and ecological conditions that the species 
underwent. But here again, we have to levels of explanation: the microevolutionary level 
of neo-Darwinism that focuses on change in gene frequencies within a species and the 
macroevolutionary level of large-scale trends involving many species, such as extinction 
rates and patterns, the formation of higher taxa, and the mode and tempo of morphological 
evolution in several related lineages. But here again, both levels have to be integrated. For 
while the advent of major novelties (such as the evolution of limbs) or whole body plans 
involves macroevolutionary events, at the same time it has to be made plausible how the 
advent of a phenotypic novelty can be consistent with modes of genetic change within 
populations. But why, or so one might ask, is neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory with its 
use of population genetics not in a position to account for the origin of novelties, all by 
itself? One reason is that neo-Darwinism explains phenotypic change based on natural 
selection acting on existing heritable phenotypic variation. This, however, does not explain 
why the phenotypic variation could have been produced in the first place. Of course, it has 
been known for a while what mechanisms produce genotypic variation. But this is not the 
question to be answered in this context. The crucial question in this context is how 
genotypic variation translates into phenotypic variation – and those questions are in the 
domain of developmental biology.  
Another reason is that, while genetic variation is produced in a largely random and 
unbiased fashion, this does not apply to the thereby generated phenotypic variation. Some 
phenotypic variants are developmentally impossible. Among the possible variants some are 
more likely to occur than others. Thus there is a developmentally grounded bias in the 
amount of heritable phenotypic variation generated. Furthermore, many novelties seem to 
involve a breaking up of developmental or functional constraints that prevailed in the 
ancestral lineage. A case in point is the shift from reptilian scales to avian feathers. Both 
structures may have some common developmental roots, but contrary to previous 
assumptions feathers did not evolve in a smooth transition from scales. For, feathers are 
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not within the normal mutational range of scales. That is, feathers were governed by 
certain developmental constraints. Therefore, an account of novelties has to explain first, 
how ancestral developmental constraints could have been and were broken thereby leading 
to the emergence of the novelty, and second, how the new structure was developmentally 
integrated into other structures. 
A third an last reason why neo-Darwinism cannot do without developmental 
biology is that many novelties are mere by-products of selection, that is, of adaptive 
evolution. That is, there was no selection for certain tissues getting close to each other. In 
those cases, natural selection is of course causally involved, but it does not carry the 
explanatory force in the account of novelty.  
The moral of it all is, features within organisms must be explanatorily important for 
the explanation of novelties. Thus, an account of novelties does in fact need knowledge of 
many different fields, such as phylogeny, paleontology, ecology, biogeography, neo-
Darwinism and developmental biology. And of course, knowledge of functional 
morphology is of importance, as well. For the evolutionary origin of novel structures 
includes also function features. The case of explaining novelties, as many other cases as 
well, allows for no reduction to one of the above-mentioned disciplines. One reason is that 
structures on different levels can sometimes evolve independently of one another. Another 
is, that the same gene can be involved in different developmental pathways or in the 
production of non-homologous structures in different species. That means that, first of all, 
biologists have to find the various natural kinds or units that are relevant for a particular 
developmental or evolutionary explanation.  
The necessary failure of reduction should not lead us to the contrary opinion that 
evo-devo is just a case of pluralism. The combination of different methods and approaches 
is not a mere accident. On the contrary, as I tried to show, accounting for the evolutionary 
origin of novelties makes it necessary to integrate different theoretical models and modes 
of explanations. Evo-devo needs both microevolutionary theories of population genetics 
and macroevolutionary models of palaeontology. Both scientific approaches have to be 
combined in this case. Likewise, explanations of developmental biology and functional 
morphology have to be integrated with neo-Darwinian modes of explanation. Of course, 
developmental biology and functional morphology lay out the causes or mechanisms that 
actually account for the origin of novelty. That is, these disciplines carry most explanatory 
force. But, and this is the important point, there is nothing intrinsic about both disciplines 
that makes them explanatory fundamental.  
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Now, why did I tell you all that? Because I think the example of evo-devo shows 
that unification is not an aim in itself. That there is no general linear ordering of 
explanatory more or less fundamental theories or disciplines does not only show that there 
is no hierarchy among sciences, a fact Kitcher himself argued for, it also shows that the 
epistemic relations between different approaches are rather complex and, what is of 
importance, the relative contribution and explanatory fundamentality of each approach 
depends on and varies with the particular problem. And each problem has its own criteria 
of explanatory adequacy. Thus, what amount of integration or unification is needed 
depends on those criteria. They set the standards of what shape a satisfactory explanation 
has to take. By forming the overall explanans for the explanandum these criteria determine 
which theoretical and/or empirical ideas are relevant for solving the problem. Thus, criteria 
of explanatory adequacy – together with the specific problem – do not only determine the 
amount of unification needed, they determine if unification of different methods is 
necessary at all. Therefore, unification, as I said, is not an aim in itself, but is likely to be 
needed for the aim of solving a complex scientific problem. In contrast to Kitcher`s “ideal 
of finding as much unity as we can”, I recommend the ideal of finding as much unity as 
scientists need in order to solve a scientific problem.  
If I am right, then sciences are not distinguished from non-sciences by having the 
aim of unification as a regulative ideal. This and the discussion in the beginning suggests 
then that sciences do not share one common end. And what is more, even a single science 
does not have specific ends. To put it in the words of Richard Feynman (nobel-prize 
winner in physics): “Science is like sex. Sure, it may give some practical results, but that`s 
not why we do it.” Thus, sciences are neither ultimately distinguishable by their methods – 
both from one another and from non-sciences nor by their aims. They do not aim for truth 
in general, nor for natural laws, nor for unification. What does this mean for my question 
of what is (a) science? I think it means we have to stick to the in my opinion very unsexy 
claim that sciences are held together by family resemblances. This allows for variations of 
scientific standards within history and disciplines, and it allows for an influence of the 
public in the determination of what is to count as a science. The latter a thing that Kitcher, 
to my knowledge, embraces.  	  
